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Abstract
In legal cases, stories or scenarios can serve as the context for a crime when reasoning with
evidence. In order to develop a scientifically founded technique for evidential reasoning, a method
is required for the representation and evaluation of various scenarios in a case. In this paper the
probabilistic technique of Bayesian networks is proposed as a method for modeling narrative, and
it is shown how this can be used to capture a number of narrative properties.
Bayesian networks quantify how the variables in a case interact. Recent research on Bayesian
networks applied to legal cases includes the development of a list of legal idioms: recurring
substructures in legal Bayesian networks. Scenarios are coherent presentations of a collection of
states and events, and qualitative in nature. A method combining the quantitative, probabilistic
approach with the narrative approach would strengthen the tools to represent and evaluate
scenarios.
In a previous paper, the development of a design method for modeling multiple scenarios in a
Bayesian network was initiated. The design method includes two narrative idioms: the scenario
idiom and the merged scenarios idiom. In this current paper, the method of [34] is extended
with a subscenario idiom and it is shown how the method can be used to represent characteristic
features of narrative.
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1 Introduction
In a criminal trial, narrative can provide a context for what happened. A story or scenario
gives a coherent presentation of the states and events around a crime and (implicitly) how
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these led to the evidence that was found. It is then up to a judge or juror to evaluate
whether there is a scenario sufficiently supported by evidence to believe that this is in fact
what happened. In order to develop a scientifically founded method for reasoning with
evidence in a legal case, we propose to represent and evaluate crime scenarios in a Bayesian
network.
Narrative has been one of three dominant approaches in the literature on reasoning
with evidence, next to argumentation and probability [17]. Recently, Verheij [33] proposed
to integrate the three approaches. In a previous project [5, 4, 6, 8], a hybrid theory for
stories and arguments in legal cases was developed. Currently, we are working on the
connection between probabilistic models and narrative. We build upon the recent application
of Bayesian networks to legal cases.
A Bayesian network represents a joint probability distribution over a collection of vari-
ables and consists of a graph, expressing the connections between variables in the domain,
and underlying probability tables for these variables. As such, a Bayesian network can be
used to represent the information that is available about a case, including evidence, hypo-
thetical events and their connections.
In the legal field, the construction of a Bayesian network for a case is not at all straight-
forward. The network should include variables relevant to the case, but these differ from
case to case. This contrasts with, for example, the medical field, where Bayesian networks
have been used successfully to determine the most probable disease given a set of symp-
toms. For a given set of symptoms, a doctor knows in advance which tests will be relevant
to perform and what their possible outcomes are, and a preconstructed Bayesian network
can be selected. Unlike this relatively closed world of medical diagnoses, the legal field deals
with a quite open world, where unpredictable relevant variables may turn up. For example,
a yellow car passing by the evening before a burglary can seem irrelevant, until it turns out
that it was driven by one of the suspects, inspecting the property before breaking in.
The application of Bayesian networks to legal cases has received quite some attention in
recent research. Keppens [18] studied the combination of arguments and Bayesian networks
in the context of law. Hepler, Dawid and Leucari [16] proposed the idea of often recurring
substructures in the graph of a Bayesian network, which is also the basis of work by Fenton,
Neil and Lagnado [14, 13, 20]. Fenton et al. developed a list of legal idioms, substructures
that often occur in Bayesian networks for legal cases. Such idioms can be regarded as
building blocks for a network, representing basic patterns in evidential reasoning. We intend
to develop narrative idioms for representing scenarios in a legal case.
In our previous paper, we proposed to represent crime scenarios in a Bayesian network
with the use of two narrative idioms: the scenario idiom for modeling scenarios, and the
merged scenarios idiom for modeling multiple scenarios in one Bayesian network. Further-
more, we provided an initial sketch of a procedure for constructing such a Bayesian network.
In this paper, we add a third idiom, the subscenario idiom, and we discuss how the scenario
idiom and the subscenario idiom can be used to capture a number of narrative properties
as they have been discussed in the literature. The contributions of this paper are threefold:
(1) we give an analysis of characteristic features of narrative following recent work in the
emerging field of computational narrative; (2) we extend the design method with a sub-
scenario idiom; and (3) we show how the extended method can be used to represent the
characteristic features from the analysis of narrative: structure, coherence, plausibility and
the use of commonsense knowledge.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is a literature study on narrative and its
properties. In Section 3 some preliminaries on Bayesian networks are presented. In Section
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(a) Substories from the Anchored Narratives The-
ory ([9] as adapted by Verheij [32]).
(b) An example of a story with substories from
[7]. Arrows are pointed up since they repres-
ent inferences made from evidence and common
knowledge.
Figure 1 Substories.
4 our design method and its development so far is presented. We extend this method with
the new subscenario idiom in Section 5. Section 6 returns to the narrative properties, and
the way in which these can be modeled with our extended design method. The paper is
concluded in Section 7.
2 Narrative and its properties: a literature study
Literature on narrative spans a broad range of interests, from folk tales [27] to computer
games [36] and TV-shows [22], and from determining the underlying plot of a story [21] to
parsing and understanding a text [23]. This paper is concerned with legal stories, which we
call scenarios: coherent collections of states and events, describing what can have happened
around a supposed crime. Typically, there are multiple scenarios describing various accounts
of what happened, and it is up to a judge or juror to find out which is true, based on the
available and admissible evidence. Recent research on narrative in legal cases includes the
development of a hybrid theory for stories and arguments [5] and simulating or animating a
specific scenario with agents [31]. We focus on representing and evaluating various scenarios
for a case.
The value of narrative in legal applications has been investigated in terms of various
properties of narrative, such as a narrative’s coherence, plausibility and the fact that it builds
upon commonsense knowledge of the world. The sections below treat several properties of
narrative that can be found in the literature, where reports on the 2009 workshop on the
computational modeling of narrative [29, 15] served as a starting point.
2.1 Narrative structure
Three common denominators amongst representations of narrative are [15, 29]:
1. narratives have to do with sequences of events;
2. narratives have a hierarchical structure;
3. narratives are (eventually) grounded in commonsense knowledge of the world.
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Following items (1) and (2), we take a scenario to be a collection of states and events
with some coherent structure, either sequential or built up from subscenarios. Item (3),
concerning commonsense knowledge, will be discussed in Section 2.4.
In a sequential structure, narrative is viewed as ‘a succession of happenings’ [29]. Schank
and Abelson in their famous Script Theory [30] claim that for a proper text, a ‘causal chain’
can be constructed to represent it. Our case study [34] was done with this perspective in
mind.
Alternatively, stories can be viewed as built up from substories. The idea of substories is
prominently present in the Anchored Narratives Theory by Wagenaar et al. [35], see Figure
1a for their schematic representation of a story. There, the main story is ultimately anchored
in commonsense generalizations. An example of a story with substories, taken from [7], is
the following (see Figure 1b, where the anchoring is in evidence rather than in commonsense
generalizations): Julius and Peter had a fight. This led to Julius firing a gun at Peter, who
died as a result of this gunshot. This story consists of substories about Julius and Peter
having a fight, Julius firing a gun at Peter and Peter dying of the gunshot.
2.2 Coherence
In the previous section, a scenario was said to be a collection of states and events with
some coherent structure. In this section we further explore this notion of coherence, in
light of scripts or story schemes (Section 2.2.1) and the transfer of evidential support as a
consequence of narrative coherence (Section 2.2.2)
2.2.1 Scripts or story schemes
In an attempt to elucidate what makes a story or scenario coherent, one can study it from
the perspective of Schank and Abelson’s scripts [30]. Their scripts are used to explain how
a listener can understand a story, and fill up the gaps that were left out when the story
was told. Or as they say: “the meaning of a text is more than the sum of the meanings of
individual sentences.”
Schank and Abelson famously illustrated their theory with the example of a restaurant
script: when a story is told about someone having dinner in a restaurant, the listener
recognizes these events because he or she has a script of a typical restaurant visit in mind.
This makes it possible for the listener to infer details that were omitted in the story. For
example, when the story includes ‘after ordering the food, he ate it’, the listener will infer
that between those two events, the waitress brought him his food.
A script is much like a ‘template’ for what elements a story (about a restaurant, for
example), can or should contain. On the one hand, a listener uses this to make small
inferences and fill up the gaps in a story. On the other hand, and this is not so much
emphasized by Schank and Abelson [30], the storyteller makes sure that his story is perceived
as coherent by adhering to a script. This idea of a template for what makes a complete story,
can also be found in Pennington and Hastie’s ideas on completeness [26] of a story, which
led to Bex’s story schemes [5].
Pennington and Hastie [25, 26] divide the coherence of narrative into three factors: con-
sistency, completeness and plausibility. For them, the consistency of a story means that
there should be no contradictions within the story. Plausibility is used to describe how well
the story fits in with our knowledge of the real world. This will be discussed more elabor-
ately in Section 2.3 below. Finally, completeness is ‘the extent to which a story has all of
its parts’ [26] and can be regarded as a measure of how well a story follows a script.
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In previous work by Bex and colleagues [5, 4, 6, 8], Pennington and Hastie’s ideas on
narrative coherence resurfaced in the formal setting of a hybrid theory for arguments and
stories dealing with evidence in legal cases. There, a story is taken to be a coherent sequence
of states and events. Arguments can be used to reason about the quality of the story: built
upon evidential data available in the case, arguments can support states and events or causal
connections in the story. Finally, arguments can also be used to reason about how well a
story fits in and completes a so-called story scheme. The hybrid theory thereby implements
the concept of a story’s completeness.
Due to story schemes, a story for a legal case usually involves more states or events than
what can be inferred directly from the available evidence. This is a valuable property in legal
applications: it can lead to the finding of new evidence. In the hybrid theory, the notions of
evidential gaps and story consequences are introduced. These refer to states or events that
remain unsupported by evidence (evidential gaps) and new evidence that is found by trying
to fill up these evidential gaps (story consequences).
2.2.2 Transfer of evidential support
A story or scenario is more than the sum of its parts. Separately, each state or event
may seem uninteresting, or irrelevant to the case. By putting the states and events into a
coherent whole and providing evidence for some of them, the scenario can be strong enough
to make us believe in an event for which there is no direct evidence. This is illustrated by
the following example:
I Example 1. We consider a famous Dutch case (known as ‘De Deventer Moordzaak’)1, in
which a widow was murdered. Her accountant was convicted for the murder, but according
to some legal experts this was unjust. One of their arguments [11] presents an alternative
scenario consisting of a number of small observations of the crime scene as it was found after
the murder. In the original scenario for which the accountant was convicted, the suspect
called the widow on the phone at 20:36 and drove to her home to kill her. In the alternative
scenario, the killer must have been in the house much earlier than the accountant could
have been given the phone call. In this scenario, the widow was doing the dishes and hadn’t
finished writing her shopping list when she was interrupted by the killer. Due to her strict
routine this must have been shortly after the end of the eight o’clock news. The ingredients
for this alternative scenario are small observations of seemingly unrelated details, such as an
open notebook and pen on the table (she hadn’t finished her shopping list) and the widow’s
apron on a chair in the conservatory (she was doing the dishes when she was interrupted by
the doorbell). The neighbors testified that the widow always had a very strict routine, and
together with the aforementioned details this leads to a coherent alternate scenario.
In this murder case example, the factor of interest is what time the killer entered the
house. Given the time of the phone call, it would have taken the accountant quite some
time to drive to the widow’s house, giving her the time to finish her dishes and her shopping
list. In the alternative scenario, someone else must have been the killer. There was no direct
evidence for this specific event, but by presenting a coherent scenario with events for which
evidence is available (such as, the widow was disturbed while she was doing the dishes), it
can still become believable. It is this manifestation of coherence, which we shall refer to as
transfer of evidential support, that we want to capture in our models.
1 Information about this case can be found on www.rechtspraak.nl with code LJN BA 1024.
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2.3 Plausibility
Plausibility of a story is a term often discussed in literature on narrative and law (for
example, in [26, 35, 5]. In a criminal trial, scenarios are often highly unlikely, such as an
alibi that just seems hard to believe. But even a very implausible scenario can become
probable when there is enough evidence to support it. It is then up to the judge or juror
to take this evidence into consideration and decide which scenario is probable enough to
assume that this is what happened.
Pennington and Hastie describe the plausibility of a story as “the extent to which the
story is consistent which knowledge of real or imagined events in the real world” [26]. Bex
formalizes this by expressing a story’s plausibility in terms of how many elements of the
story are supported by commonsense knowledge. The key idea of plausibility is that a story
is plausible when as a whole, it seems credible to us given our knowledge of (and experience
with) the real world.
2.4 Commonsense knowledge
In order to understand narrative, a listener needs commonsense knowledge about the world.
This was already a factor in the idea of scripts to understand stories, and in the concept
of plausibility as described above. The use of commonsense knowledge was mentioned as
one of the three common denominators of narrative. According to Bex and Verheij [8, 7],
commonsense knowledge can be captured in either story schemes or argument schemes.
Commonsense knowledge plays an important role in the Anchored Narratives Theory
by Wagenaar et al. [35]. There, a story in a criminal trial should be firmly anchored in
commonsense knowledge in the form of generalizations such as ‘an expert witness usually
speaks the truth’. Bex’s hybrid theory [5] is centered around the idea that a story should
be supported by evidence and commonsense knowledge.
2.5 Summarizing: properties of narrative
To summarize, the following properties of narrative have been discussed in this section:
1. Narrative structure: sequential or built up from substories;
2. Coherence, manifested in three key features:
a. A script or story scheme that serves as a template for a story;
b. Evidential gaps and story consequences: events unsupported by evidence (evidential
gaps) and the finding of new evidence (story consequences) as a result of these gaps;
c. Transfer of evidential support: evidence for one element of the story can increase the
belief in the entire story and thereby all elements of the story;
3. Plausibility: the extent to which a story seems credible to us given our knowledge of
(and experience with) the real world;
4. Commonsense knowledge: the basic knowledge needed to understand the story.
In Section 6, these properties will be further discussed, including how they are captured in
the design method presented in this paper.
3 Bayesian networks in legal cases
A Bayesian network consists of a graph (such as in Figure 2) and probability tables (such
as Tables 2a and 2b). The nodes in the graph represent variables in the domain: a Bayesian
network for a legal case typically contains hypotheses (such as Fingerprints X, abbreviated
as FP X, describing that X’s fingerprints were found at the crime scene), intermediate nodes
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Figure 2 Example of a Bayesian network.
Table 1 Examples of probability tables. Fingerprints X was abbreviated to FP X.
FP X = y FP X = n
0.2 0.8
(a) Prior probability P (FP X).
FP X = y FP X = n
Fingerprint match = y 0.9 0.01
Fingerprint match = n 0.1 0.99
(b) CPT for P (Fingerprint match | FP X)
and evidential nodes (in Figure 2, Fingerprint match describes that the police found a
match between the fingerprints found at the crime scene and suspect X).
With the arrows between nodes, dependencies and independencies between variables are
shown in the graph. These arrows are often thought of as representing causality, which can
be helpful when constructing a Bayesian network [24]. However, the arrows represent correla-
tion, not causality [10]. The conditional probability tables (CPT’s) contain the probabilities
for a node conditional on its predecessors (Table 2b shows the conditional probability table
for Fingerprint match). A node with no predecessors contains the (unconditional) prob-
abilities for each value of the variable (see Table 2a). Such probabilities are called prior
probabilities.
A Bayesian network is a representation of a joint probability distribution (JPD) [19].
The JPD contains the probabilities for each combination of values of variables, such as
P (Fingerprint match = n, Fingerprints X = y). From a Bayesian network, the num-
bers in the joint probability distribution can be retrieved, as well as any prior or posterior
probability of interest.
After constructing the Bayesian network, the evidence nodes can be instantiated in the
network: the probability of the appropriate value of the evidential nodes is set to 1, and this
information is propagated through the network, leading to updated (posterior) probabilities
for the other nodes. There are tools available for such calculations, such as GeNIe 2.0.2
Bayesian networks are often used as a compact representation of a joint probability
distribution. An advantage of a Bayesian network is the insight that the graphical structure
provides into the connections between the variables. Though a Bayesian network requires
less numbers to be made explicit, both a JPD and a Bayesian network require full information
about the probabilities in the domain. Eliciting these numbers is a known issue for Bayesian
networks. A number of methods for finding these numbers, or guiding experts to find these
numbers, are available [28].
There is an ongoing debate about the use of Bayesian methods in court. There has been
a ruling by the Court of Appeal in the UK in 2010, stating that Bayes’ theorem should
not be used in evaluating evidence, except for DNA and ‘possibly other areas where there
is a firm statistical base’ [12]. On the other hand, a member of the Supreme Court in
the Netherlands, together with the Netherlands Forensic Institute (Nederlands Forensisch
Instituut, NFI), recently advocated the use of Bayesian thinking [1, 2, 3].
2 GeNIe 2.0 is available for free on genie.sis.pitt.edu.
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(a) The scenario idiom (b) The scenario idiom for the burglary scenario
Figure 3 The scenario idiom. Dotted lines denote possible connections between states and
events.
Arguments against the use of Bayesian networks in court concern the known problem
of eliciting the numbers in the probability tables, and it is yet to be investigated how well
the methods mentioned above can help in the specific area of legal applications. Another
argument is that, even when these numbers are known, it is questionable whether they can
be used to make decisions about one individual. Being aware of these arguments, we intend
the Bayesian networks resulting from our method to be used as a tool to compare scenarios
and their evidential support, rather than to calculate absolute numbers. Furthermore, we
explicitly do not intend to make the decision for a judge or juror; the resulting network is
meant to advise and provide insight into the case.
4 Representing scenarios in a Bayesian network
In this section we review our design method from [34] for modeling crime scenarios in a
Bayesian network. The goal of this method is to represent multiple scenarios concerning
a crime in one network. We focus on constructing the graph for the Bayesian network,
modeling the relevant variables of a scenario in a coherent structure. Our design method
as developed so far has two narrative idioms: the scenario idiom and the merged scenarios
idiom. In Section 5, the design method will be extended with a third idiom.
The procedure from [34] for constructing a Bayesian network consists of the following
four steps (more elaborately discussed in [34]): (1) collect all relevant scenarios, (2) model
each scenario using the scenario idiom (or the subscenario idiom), (3) merge these idioms
into one large Bayesian network with the merged scenarios idiom, and (4) add the evidence
to the network. We assume that the admissibility of the evidence has been established before
constructing this model. Evidential nodes are modeled using Fenton, Neil and Lagnado’s
evidence accuracy idiom and their idioms about dependency between evidence [14].
In Section 4.1 we review the scenario idiom, which was used in [34] to model a scenario
as a sequence of states and events in a Bayesian network. In Section 4.2 we treat the merged
scenarios idiom, and how it can be used to merge multiple scenarios in one network. [34]
gives further details about the design method, including a case study.
4.1 The scenario idiom
The scenario idiom is intended to model a scenario as a whole, capturing its coherence as
described in Section 2.2. To do this, we model connections between states and events in the
scenario, and we include a scenario node to model the underlying coherence.
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Table 2 Probability tables for the scenario idiom. Scenario Node was abbreviated to ScN.
ScN = y ScN = n
Event = y 1 x
Event = n 0 1-x
(a) Conditional probability table for a
node ‘Event’
ScN = y ScN = n
Guilt hypothesis = y 1 0
Guilt hypothesis = n 0 1
(b) Conditional probability table for the guilt hypo-
thesis
Consider the following scenario about a burglary:
Suspect X needed money, so X decided to break in. X broke the window of the house,
went in and took some items from the house.
Figure 3b (from the case study in our previous paper [34]) shows how this scenario can be
represented as a sequence of states and events. The figure illustrates the idea of the scenario
idiom: the states and events are represented as nodes in the network, with connections
between states and events drawn as arrows. The underlying probability tables express how
certain these connections are. For example, a lack of money does not always lead to the
decision to break in.
Furthermore, a scenario node is included, which is connected to all elements of the
scenario. This scenario node is needed to model a scenario’s coherence (see also Section 6.2).
Finally, there is a node for the guilt hypothesis, describing who committed what crime: this
node is included because this is ultimately the variable a judge or juror is interested in.
A general version of the scenario idiom is shown in Figure 3a. The idiom is constructed
as follows:
1. Each state or event in the scenario is represented as a binary node with values ‘yes’ and
‘no’ in the network.
2. When there are connections between states or events in the scenario, arrows are drawn
between the corresponding nodes (see [24] for what constitutes a connection between
variables). Note that the connections between states and events within a scenario do not
neccessarily need to form a sequence; one state or event can be connected to multiple
elements of the scenario (not shown in Figure 3a). However, representing more complex
connections within a scenario will be easier with the subscenario idiom (see Section 5).
3. A scenario node with values ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is included in the network. Arrows are drawn
from this scenario node to each of the states or events in that scenario.
4. The probability table for the scenario node expresses the probability that the scenario is
true without taking any of the evidence into account. This number corresponds to the
plausibility of the scenario and is a subjective number that can be estimated by a judge
or juror.
5. The conditional probability table for a state or event node depends on the connections
of this state or event with the rest of the scenario. When the node is connected to other
elements of the scenario, the numbers should be filled in accordingly. With no other
connections, the probability table will look like Table 3a. The left column shows the
logical relation that the event is an element in the scenario: when the scenario is true, all
its elements must be true. The right column (when the scenario node is not true) is less
straightforward. It expresses the probability that the event took place when the scenario
as a whole is not true. These numbers in the right column are crucial for the evidential
support: the higher the number for P (Event = yes | ScN = no) (x in the upper right of
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Guilt hypothesis 1 = y Guilt hypothesis 1 = n
GH2 = y GH2 = n GH2 = y GH2 = n
allowed 0 1 1 1
not allowed 1 0 0 0
Figure 4 The merged scenarios idiom and the conditional probability table for the constraint
node. Guilt hypothesis 2 was abbreviated to GH2.
the table), the lower the evidential support. This makes sense: when an event is quite
likely to happen even when the scenario is not true, knowing that it happened has less of
an influence on the probability of the entire scenario (see Section 6.2 for a more elaborate
discussion of this point).
6. Finally, a guilt hypothesis is included, stating briefly what the scenario describes more
elaborately: who committed what crime. Now that only one scenario is modeled (this
will change when the merged scenarios idiom is used), the conditional probability table
for the guilt hypothesis is straightforward: it follows logically from the scenario node.
When the scenario node is true, the guilt hypothesis is true, and when the scenario node
is not true, neither is the guilt hypothesis (see Table 3b).
4.2 The merged scenarios idiom
The merged scenarios idiom is used to combine multiple scenarios, in order to model them
in one Bayesian network. The idiom puts a constraint on the guilt hypotheses, making sure
that they cannot be true simultaneously. Therefore, a crucial step in the design method
is to make sure that all guilt hypotheses are mutually exclusive or equal. Then when two
scenarios are merged with the merged scenarios idiom, equal guilt hypotheses are represented
by one node3 and the constraint is put on mutually exclusive guilt hypotheses.
A constraint node is a common technique [19] to make sure that two or more nodes cannot
be true simultaneously. It has values allowed and not allowed and there are arrows from
the nodes that need to be constrained to the constraint node. The conditional probability
table expresses logically that when more than one of the parent nodes is true, the constraint
3 All scenario nodes that were connected to any of the original nodes will now be connected to the one
new node. The probability table for this new node expresses that the guilt hypothesis is true when at
least one of the scenarios connected to it is true.
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(a) The subscenario idiom (b) The subscenario idiom for the burglary scenario
Figure 5 The subscenario idiom. The dotted lines denote possible connections between states
and events or between subscenarios.
node has value ‘not allowed’ (see the table in Figure 4). By instantiating the value to
‘allowed’, it can never be the case that more than one parent node is true at the same time.
When merging two scenarios, it may be the case that certain states or events in different
scenarios contradict each other. In that case, a constraint needs to be put on these states
or events; this constraint node is exactly like the constraint node from the merged scenarios
idiom.
Furthermore, different scenarios may overlap, containing the same states or events, or
even the same subscenario. When this happens, there will be separate nodes in different
(sub)scenario idioms describing equal states, events or subscenarios. These will be replaced
by one node describing this state, event or subscenario, which is then connected to all nodes
that the original nodes were connected to.
The merged scenarios idiom in Figure 4 shows the merging of two scenario idioms. Ana-
logously, the merged scenarios idiom can be used to merge two subscenario idioms or a
combination of a subscenario idiom and a scenario idiom.
5 Extending the method: the subscenario idiom
In this section we introduce the scenario idiom in order to represent scenarios with a structure
of subscenarios such as in Figure 1a.
5.1 The subscenario idiom
In the burglary example for the scenario idiom, the state ‘X decided to break in’ was connec-
ted to multiple states to express that it was the motive behind several actions of the burglar.
With the subscenario idiom this can be modeled as in Figure 5b. There, the subscenario ‘X
needed money so X decided to break in’ now serves as a motive for the subscenario ‘X broke
the window, went into the house and took some items’.
The ideas behind the subscenario idiom are closely related to the ideas behind the scen-
ario idiom in the previous section. The coherence of an entire scenario is again modeled with
use of a scenario node, which is connected to all elements of the scenario. In addition, there
is now a level between the scenario node and the state or event nodes: the subscenario nodes.
A general version of the subscenario idiom is shown in Figure 5a. It can be constructed in
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Table 3 Conditional probability table for a subscenario node. Scenario node was abbreviated
to ScN.
ScN = y ScN = n
Subscenario node 1= y 1 0
Subscenario node 1= n 0 1
Table 4 Conditional probability table for a subscenario node with a connection to another
subscenario node. Scenario node was abbreviated to ScN and Subscenario node 1 to Sub1.
ScN = y ScN = n
Sub1 = y Sub1 = n Sub1 = y Sub1 = n
Subscenario node 2= y 1 0 0 0
Subscenario node 2= n 0 1 1 1
the same way as the scenario idiom, adding the following items to the list from Section 4.1
and changing items 3 and 5 from that list to read as below:
A. For a collection of states and events that form a subscenario, a subscenario node with
values ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is included. An arrow is drawn from the subscenario to each state
or event in the subscenario.
B. When there are connections between subscenarios, arrows are drawn between the corres-
ponding subscenario nodes.
C. The conditional probability tables for the subscenario nodes express a logical relation:
when the scenario node is true, all subscenario nodes must be true. When a scenario
node is not true, none of the subscenario nodes are true. This leads to a probability table
as in Table 3, or in the case of a connection between subscenarios, Table 4. In the case
of the scenario node is false, we assume that a subscenario cannot be true in itself, but
that it really needs the entire scenario to be true. This choice was made for technical
reasons, to ensure that the subscenario idiom amounts to the same as the scenario idiom
when all other connections are the same. See also Section 5.2.
3. (adapted) A scenario node with values ‘yes’ and ‘no’ is included in the network. Arrows
are drawn from the scenario node to each of the subscenario nodes and any state or event
in that scenario that is not connected to a subscenario node.
5. (adapted) The conditional probability table for a state or event node depends on the
connections of this state or event with the rest of the scenario. When there is only a
connection with the subscenario node, the numbers are filled in as follows: when the
subscenario node is true, the state or event logically follows. When the subscenario node
is not true, the numbers express the probability that this particular state or event would
occur without the subscenario being true.
5.2 The subscenario idiom versus the scenario idiom
The scenario idiom and the subscenario idiom both represent states and events in a scenario
as nodes, adding a scenario node to model the coherence of the scenario. However, the
subscenario idiom includes another level in between the state and event nodes and the
scenario node: the subscenario nodes. The subscenario nodes make it easily expressible that
a collection of states or events (one subscenario) is connected to another collection in its
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Figure 6 A representation with the subscenario idiom (left) and one with the scenario idiom
(right).
entirety: the decision to break in to a house can be connected to the entire subscenario
of actually breaking in. Another advantage of using subscenarios is that when modeling
multiple scenarios, the same subscenario can be connected to multiple scenario nodes.
When a scenario with no complicating connections between subscenario nodes (unlike
the burglary example) is represented in the scenario idiom and in the subscenario idiom,
there will be no difference in interpretation when calculating the probabilities. In particular,
for a situation as shown in Figure 6, the probabilities P (Event1 | Scenario node) for all
values of the scenario node and Event1 will be the equal in both networks. For example,
consider P (Event1=y | Scenario node=n) in both networks.
First note that by construction, the conditional probability tables for the state and event
nodes in the subscenario idiom consist of the same numbers as in the scenario idiom (see
Table 3a), now as probabilities conditional on the subscenario nodes. Furthermore, the
probability tables for the subscenario idioms consist only of zeros and ones. Therefore, for
P (Event1=y | Scenario node=n) in the left network, we have
P (Event1=y | Scenario node=n)
= P (Event1=y | Subscenario node1=y)
· P (Subscenario node1=y | Scenario node=n)
+ P (Event1=y | Subscenario node1=n)
· P (Subscenario node1=n | Scenario node=n)
= P (Event1=y | Subscenario node1=y) · 0 + P (Event1=y | Subscenario node1=n) · 1
= P (Event1=y | Subscenario node1=n)
and this was set equal to P (Event1=y | Scenario node=n) (in the right network) in the
probability tables.
Note that this calculation will not hold for the burglary example, since the connections
between state and event nodes are not the same in the scenario idiom and the subscenario
idiom. The connection from the event ‘X decided to break in’ to the event ‘X broke a window’
has now moved to the level of the subscenario nodes, which changes the interpretation of
the scenario and thereby the probability tables. The subscenario version of the burgarly
example is therefore really different from the example with the scenario idiom; this shows
that the subscenario idiom can model a different interpretation of the scenario.
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Figure 7 Partial scenario idiom for the transfer of evidential support example.
6 Representing narrative properties with the design method
Returning to the discussion of narrative and its properties from Section 2, in this section we
explain how each of the properties listed in Section 2.5 can be treated using the representa-
tional techniques from Sections 4 and 5.
6.1 Narrative structure
With our design method, the collection of states and events of which a scenario consists serves
as a basis for the domain of the Bayesian network: each state or event was represented in
the network with a node. The structure of narrative (item 1 from the list in Section 2.5) is
captured with either the scenario idiom (best suited for sequential narrative representation)
or the subscenario idiom (for modeling subscenarios). It depends on the interpretation of
the scenario which idiom can best be used to represent it.
6.2 Coherence
In the construction of the scenario idiom and the subscenario idiom, the scenario node was
intended to capture the coherence of a scenario. In this section we discuss how the structures
of these idioms relate to scripts or story schemes and the transfer of evidential support.
6.2.1 Scripts or story schemes
The concept of a script or story scheme (item 2a) inspired the idea of the scenario idiom
and the subscenario idiom. They can be regarded as templates for representing a scenario
in a Bayesian network. The idioms as presented in this paper can be the basis for scripts
or schemes for specific crimes, such as a scheme prescribing what elements a typical murder
case scenario has. However, crimes in particular are out of the ordinary, so a corpus of
typical crime schemes will always be only the starting point of a specific model for a case.
Further research is needed on the use of scripts and schemes for legal cases.
The idea of evidential gaps and story consequences (item 2b) fits particularly well with
the technique of Bayesian networks. By convention, Bayesian networks are usually construc-
ted such that the arrows are directed from cause to effect. Intuitively, the elements of the
scenario seem to ‘predict’ the evidence. When a predicted piece of evidence is not available,
the evidential node is nonetheless included in the network, but it is left uninstantiated: it
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is not fixed to have value ‘yes’. This means there is an evidential gap. In the investigative
process of a crime, such obvious absence of evidence may lead to a search for this particular
piece of evidence. When this evidence is then found, the evidential node can be instantiated
to ‘yes’, and we have found a story consequence.
6.2.2 Transfer of evidential support
The scenario idiom and the subscenario idiom are constructed such that they can capture
the transfer of evidential support (item 2c), namely, via the scenario node. Since there is no
direct evidence about the scenario node, it is never fixed on a value (it is never instantiated),
leaving a connection between any two elements of the scenario connected to the scenario
node through which they can influence each other (any pair of states or events in the scenario
is d-connected (see [19]) via the scenario node).
In Section 2.2, the concept of transfer of evidential support was introduced with the
example of the murder case involving a scenario with seemingly unconnected states or events.
However, since these elements together formed a coherent scenario, a transfer of evidential
support was possible: by providing evidence for some elements the belief in all elements of
the scenario increases.
The example scenario described the victim not finishing her usual evening routine, doing
the dishes, writing a shopping list, etcetera (more details were involved in the actual case).
Instead, she was disturbed by the killer ringing her doorbell shortly after the eight o’clock
news. Figure 7 shows part of the scenario idiom for this scenario (the dots suggest that the
scenario actually involved more elements).
There is no direct evidence for the event that the killer came in soon after the news.
However, there is evidence for the fact that the victim was interrupted from doing the
dishes (the apron) and that she did not finish her shopping list (the notebook and pen).
The corresponding nodes for these evidential data can be instantiated to have value ‘yes’,
which leads to a higher probability for these particular events in the scenario. Since we
have no direct knowledge about the scenario node itself (it is never instantiated), a higher
probability for one of the events will lead to a higher probability of the scenario node being
true, leading to a higher probability of the killer ringing the doorbell shortly after the eight
o’clock news.
The transfer of evidential support thus proceeds via the scenario node. This has to do
with the evidential support of a piece of evidence for the entire scenario: as the posterior
probability for the scenario node changes, due to the evidential support for it, the posterior
probability for all events in that scenario change simultaneously: they logically follow from
the scenario node.
When a piece of evidence supports an element of a scenario, the posterior probability
P (ScN=y | Event=y) that the scenario node is true given that the event is true will be
different from the prior probability P (ScN=y). The more P (ScN=y | Event=y) differs from
P (ScN=y), the stronger the evidential support is for the scenario. We propose to use the
fraction P (ScN=y | Event=y)P (ScN=y) as a measure of the evidential support.
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the strength of the evidential support depends on the
conditional probability tables for the events in the scenario (as in Table 3a), and in particular
the number P (Event=y | ScN=n), denoted as x in the table. When this number is high, this
means that the event has a high probability of taking place when the scenario node is not
true. This leads to a lower evidential support. In particular, the probability of the scenario
node taking place is changes less when the number x is closer to 1. To see this, we expand
the probability P (ScN=y | Event=y) using Bayes’ rule:
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P (ScN=y | Event=y) = P (Event=y | ScN=y) · P (ScN=y)
P (Event=y) =
1 · P (ScN=y)
P (Event=y)
= P (ScN=y)
P (Event=y|ScN=y) · P (ScN=y) + P (Event=y|ScN=n) · P (ScN=n)
= P (ScN=y)1 · P (ScN=y) + x · P (ScN=n)
P (ScN=y | Event=y)
P (ScN=y) =
1
P (ScN=y) + x · P (ScN=n) .
When the number x is close to 1, then the fraction on the right is close to 1 (since the prior
probabilities of the scenario node add up to 1). This means that P (ScN=y | Event=y) is
almost equal to P (ScN=y), so there is less evidential support. The smaller x is, the smaller
the denominator, so the larger the fraction and thereby the evidential support. This is in
line with our intuition: when an event can perfectly well take place without the scenario
node being true, then knowing that the event took place contributes less to our belief in the
scenario node.
6.3 Plausibility
Plausibility (item 3) can be interpreted in terms of probability as the probability of the
scenario without taking any evidence into account. In our representation, this is the prior
probability for the scenario node having value ‘yes’. This number is a subjective estimate,
which can be provided by a judge or juror, and it is taken up in the probability table for
the scenario node.
6.4 Commonsense knowledge
Commonsense knowledge (item 4) in the form of generalizations underlying a connection
between two states or events in a scenario is expressed numerically as a number in the
probability table in our method: the more ‘common’ the connection is (such as, ‘when a
suspect breaks a window, he might leave fingerprints’), the higher the conditional probability
connecting the two states or events. As a consequence, scenarios that are close to our
commonsense knowledge will have stronger connections in the Bayesian network.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, a design method for modeling crime scenarios in a Bayesian network has been
presented and extended, and connections with literature on narrative have been discussed.
In our previous paper [34], the development of the design method was started. There, a
procedure for constructing a Bayesian network based on scenarios was introduced, including
two narrative idioms: the scenario idiom and the merged scenarios idiom. In this current pa-
per, the method was extended with a subscenario idiom, such that both sequential scenarios
and scenarios built up from subscenarios could be represented in the Bayesian network.
The notions of narrative coherence, plausibility and the use of commonsense knowledge
have been interpreted in terms of the representational techniques developed. The transfer of
evidential support (as a consequence of narrative coherence) is captured with the construc-
tion of the (sub)scenario idiom. The probabilities in the network reflect the plausibility and
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the use of commonsense knowledge. By modeling these narrative properties, the Bayesian
network can be used to evaluate and compare crime scenarios.
Further research is needed on the use of scripts and story schemes in the representation
of a crime scenario. It deserves to be investigated how a corpus of schemes for crimes can
serve as a starting point for the construction of specific models. Employing the concept of
a scheme may help to systematize the construction of Bayesian networks for legal cases.
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